MirOS Manual: starttls(8)

STARTTLS(8)              BSD System Manager's Manual               STARTTLS(8)

NAME

     starttls - ESMTP over TLS/SSL

DESCRIPTION

     STARTTLS is an ESMTP option, defined in RFC 2487, which is used to con-
     duct ESMTP transactions over TLS circuits. This is used to increase the
     security of mail server transactions. As of version 8.11, sendmail(8) has
     supported the use of TLS to protect ESMTP communications.

     STARTTLS allows for the combination of several security solutions for MTA
     (mail transport agent) level services through the TLS suite. These secu-
     rity features include:

     Confidentiality
             Encryption is used to protect data from passive monitoring. An
             attacker would have to recover the encryption key used to decode
             the transmitted data.

     Integrity
             Hash algorithms are used to ensure the integrity of the transmit-
             ted data, and alternatively the timestamp, protecting against a
             replay attack. This protects data from modification in transit.

     Authentication
             The use of public key encryption allows for the strong authenti-
             cation of either, or both, communicating parties. This can be
             used to allow for select features, such as relaying, to be con-
             trolled more securely.

     A new ESMTP option, STARTTLS, has been added. This is presented by the
     server when an ESMTP session is initiated. The client then begins the TLS
     portion of the ESMTP session by issuing the command "STARTTLS". The
     remaining portion of the ESMTP session occurs over a TLS channel.

Creating a private key and certificate for sendmail

     This example assumes you are creating your own self-signed certificates
     for use with sendmail and STARTTLS. If you have an existing private key
     and you simply wish to generate a new certificate (for example, if your
     old certificate has expired), see the section entitled Creating a
     certificate with an existing private key.

     For the purposes of this example the certificates will be stored in
     /etc/mail/certs, though it is possible to use a different directory if
     needed. If this directory does not already exist, you must create it:

           # mkdir /etc/mail/certs

     Next, you must generate a DSA parameter set with a command like the fol-
     lowing:

           # openssl dsaparam 1024 -out dsa1024.pem

     This would generate DSA parameters for 1024-bit DSA keys, and save them
     to the file dsa1024.pem.

     Once you have the DSA parameters generated, you can generate a certifi-
     cate and unencrypted private key using the command:

           # openssl req -x509 -nodes -days 365 -newkey dsa:dsa1024.pem \
             -out /etc/mail/certs/mycert.pem -keyout /etc/mail/certs/mykey.pem

     You may adjust the lifetime of the certificate via the -days parameter
     (one year in this example).

     Make sure to leave the private key files unencrypted, using the -nodes
     option. Otherwise, sendmail(8) will be unable to initiate TLS server
     functions.

     You can verify that the newly-generated certificate has correct informa-
     tion with the following command:

           # openssl x509 -in /etc/mail/certs/mycert.pem -text

     If you don't intend to use TLS for authentication (and if you are using
     self-signed certificates you probably don't) you can simply link your new
     certificate to CAcert.pem.

           # ln -s /etc/mail/certs/mycert.pem /etc/mail/certs/CAcert.pem

     If, on the other hand, you intend to use TLS for authentication you
     should install your certificate authority bundle as
     /etc/mail/certs/CAcert.pem.

     At this point, you no longer need the dsa1024.pem file and it can be re-
     moved.

           # rm dsa1024.pem

     Because the private key files are unencrypted, sendmail(8) is picky about
     using tight permissions on those files. The certificate directory and the
     files therein should be readable and writable only by the owner (root). A
     simple way to ensure this is to run the following:

           # chmod -R go-rwx /etc/mail/certs

Creating a certificate with an existing private key

     This example assumes you already have an existing private key,
     /etc/mail/certs/mykey.pem. You can generate a new certificate based on
     this key using the command:

           # openssl req -x509 -new -days 365 -key /etc/mail/certs/mykey.pem \
             -out /etc/mail/certs/mycert.pem
           # chmod 600 /etc/mail/certs/mycert.pem

     You may adjust the lifetime of the certificate via the -days parameter
     (one year in this example).

Configuring sendmail to utilize TLS

     The global sendmail configuration files, /etc/mail/sendmail.cf and
     /etc/mail/localhost.cf must be modified to support TLS functionality. An
     example .mc file which has entries for TLS options, such as certificates,
     is available as /usr/share/sendmail/cf/knecht.mc.

     The pertinent options are:

     •   CERT_DIR
     •   confCACERT_PATH
     •   confCACERT
     •   confSERVER_CERT
     •   confSERVER_KEY
     •   confCLIENT_CERT
     •   confCLIENT_KEY

     By default, the directory /etc/mail/certs, defined by CERT_DIR, is used
     to store certificates, and the server will use the same certificates both
     as a client (outgoing mail) and as a server (for incoming mail). This can
     be changed by having different entries for the respective roles.

     The next step is to edit the .mc files your sendmail.cf and localhost.cf
     files are generated from. First, change to the directory where your .mc
     files are stored. You will need to make TLS-enabled versions of the fol-
     lowing files: openbsd-proto.mc and openbsd-localhost.mc.

           # cd /usr/share/sendmail/cf

           # cp openbsd-proto.mc openbsd-proto-tls.mc
           # cp openbsd-localhost.mc openbsd-localhost-tls.mc

     You must then edit openbsd-proto-tls.mc, and openbsd-localhost-tls.mc to
     add the following lines after the "VERSIONID" definition (the actual
     placement within the file is not critical as long as it is after the
     "divert(0)dnl" line).

           define(`CERT_DIR',        `MAIL_SETTINGS_DIR`'certs')
           define(`confCACERT_PATH', `CERT_DIR')
           define(`confCACERT',      `CERT_DIR/CAcert.pem')
           define(`confSERVER_CERT', `CERT_DIR/mycert.pem')
           define(`confSERVER_KEY',  `CERT_DIR/mykey.pem')
           define(`confCLIENT_CERT', `CERT_DIR/mycert.pem')
           define(`confCLIENT_KEY',  `CERT_DIR/mykey.pem')

     Now that you have the TLS-enabled versions of the .mc files you must gen-
     erate .cf files from them and install the .cf files in /etc/mail.

           # make openbsd-proto-tls.cf openbsd-localhost-tls.cf

           # cp openbsd-proto-tls.cf /etc/mail/sendmail.cf
           # cp openbsd-localhost-tls.cf /etc/mail/localhost.cf

     Finally, restart sendmail with the new configuration by sending it a
     SIGHUP.

           # kill -HUP `head -1 /var/run/sendmail.pid`

     Note that those are backticks and not single quotes in the example above.

     After having installed the certificates and configuration files and hav-
     ing restarted the sendmail daemon, a new option should be presented for
     ESMTP transactions, STARTTLS. You can test this by connecting to the lo-
     cal host and issuing the "EHLO" command.

           # telnet localhost 25
           Trying ::1...
           Connected to localhost.
           Escape character is '^]'.
           220 localhost ESMTP Sendmail 8.12.1/8.12.1 ready
           EHLO localhost

     After typing EHLO localhost you should receive something like the follow-
     ing back.

           250-localhost Hello localhost [IPv6:::1], pleased to meet you
           250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
           250-PIPELINING
           250-8BITMIME
           250-SIZE
           250-DSN
           250-ETRN
           250-STARTTLS
           250-DELIVERBY
           250 HELP

     You should see "STARTTLS" listed along with the other options. If so,
     congratulations, sendmail will now use TLS to encrypt your mail traffic
     when the remote server supports it. If not, check /var/log/maillog to see
     whether sendmail has reported any security problems or other errors.

Uses for TLS-Equipped sendmail

     The most obvious use of a cryptographically enabled sendmail installation
     is for confidentiality of the electronic mail transaction and the in-
     tegrity checking provided by the cipher suite. All traffic between the
     two mail servers is encrypted, including the sender and recipient ad-
     dresses. TLS also allows for authentication of either or both systems in
     the transaction.

     One use of public key cryptography is for strong authentication. We can
     use this authentication to selectively relay clients, including other
     mail servers and mobile clients like laptops. However, there have been
     some problems getting some mail clients to work using certificate-based
     authentication. Note that your clients will have to generate certificates
     and have them signed (for trust validation) by a CA (certificate authori-
     ty) you also trust, if you configure your server to do client certificate
     checking.

     The use of the access map (usually /etc/mail/access), which is normally
     used to determine connections and relaying, can also be extended to give
     server level control for the use of TLS. Two new entries are available
     for TLS options:

           VERIFY  contains the status of the level of verification (held in
                   the macro {verify})

           ENCR    the strength of the encryption (in the macro {cipher_bits})

     VERIFY can also accept the argument for {cipher_bits}. Here are a few ex-
     ample entries that illustrate these features, and the role based granu-
     larity as well:

     Force strong (112-bit) encryption for communications for this server:

           server1.example.net ENCR:112

     For a TLS client, force string verification depths to at least 80 bits:

           TLS_Clt:desktop.example.net VERIFY:80

     Much more complicated access maps are possible, and error conditions
     (such as permanent or temporary, PERM+ or TEMP+) can be set on the basis
     of various criteria. This allows you fine-grained control over the types
     of connections you can allow.

     Note that it is unwise to force all SMTP clients to use TLS, as it is not
     yet widespread. The RFC document notes that publicly referenced SMTP
     servers, such as the MX servers for a domain, must not refuse non-TLS
     connections. However, restricted access SMTP servers, such as those for a
     corporate intranet, can use TLS as an access control mechanism.

LIMITATIONS

     One often forgotten limitation of using TLS on a mail server is the pay-
     load of the mail message and the resulting security there. Many virus and
     worm files are now distributed via electronic mail. While the mail may be
     encrypted and the servers authenticated, the payload can still be mali-
     cious. The use of a good content protection program on the desktop is
     therefore still of value even with TLS at the MTA level.

     Because sendmail with TLS can only authenticate at the server level, true
     end-to-end authentication of the mail message cannot be performed with
     only the use of STARTLS on the server. The use of S/MIME or PGP e-mail
     and trustworthy key hierarchies can guarantee full confidentiality and
     integrity of the entire message path.

     Furthermore, if a mail message traverses more than just the starting and
     ending servers, there is no way to control interactions between the in-
     tervening mail servers, which may use non-secure connections. This intro-
     duces a point of vulnerability in the chain.

     Additionally, SMTP over TLS is not yet widely implemented. The standard,
     in fact, doesn't require it, leaving it only as an option, though specif-
     ic sites can configure their servers to force it for specific clients. As
     such, it is difficult to foresee the widespread use of SMTP using TLS,
     despite the fact that the standard is, at the date of this writing, over
     two years old.

     Lastly, interoperability problems can appear between different implemen-
     tations.

SEE ALSO

     mail(1), openssl(1), afterboot(8), sendmail(8), ssl(8)

     DARPA Internet Request for Comments RFC 2487

     http://www.sendmail.org/~ca/email/starttls.html

HISTORY

     TLS features first appeared in sendmail 8.11.

MirOS BSD #10-current          January 11, 2002                              4

Generated on 2014-07-04 21:17:45 by $MirOS: src/scripts/roff2htm,v 1.79 2014/02/10 00:36:11 tg Exp $

These manual pages and other documentation are copyrighted by their respective writers; their source is available at our CVSweb, AnonCVS, and other mirrors. The rest is Copyright © 2002‒2014 The MirOS Project, Germany.
This product includes material provided by Thorsten Glaser.

This manual page’s HTML representation is supposed to be valid XHTML/1.1; if not, please send a bug report – diffs preferred.