SECURELEVEL(7) BSD Reference Manual SECURELEVEL(7)
securelevel - securelevel and its effects
The OpenBSD kernel provides four levels of system security:
-1 Permanently insecure mode
- init(8) will not attempt to raise the securelevel
- may only be set with sysctl(8) while the system is insecure
- otherwise identical to securelevel 0
0 Insecure mode
- used during bootstrapping and while the system is single-user
- all devices may be read or written subject to their permissions
- system file flags may be cleared
1 Secure mode
- default mode when system is multi-user
- securelevel may no longer be lowered except by init
- /dev/mem and /dev/kmem may not be written to
- raw disk devices of mounted filesystems are read-only
- system immutable and append-only file flags may not be removed
- kernel modules may not be loaded or unloaded
- the fs.posix.setuid sysctl(8) variable may not be changed
- the net.inet.ip.sourceroute sysctl(8) variable may not be
changed
- the machdep.kbdreset sysctl(8) variable may not be changed
2 Highly secure mode
- all effects of securelevel 1
- raw disk devices are always read-only whether mounted or not
- settimeofday(2) and clock_settime(2) may not set the time back-
wards or close to overflow
- pf(4) filter and NAT rules may not be altered
- the ddb.console and ddb.panic sysctl(8) variables may not be
raised
- Filesystems may neither be mounted nor umounted. (Maybe other
operations should be denied, too.)
- Writes to the random number generator devices, namely
/dev/srandom, /dev/urandom and /dev/arandom, are prohibited, as
well as several IOCTLs. The addpool is still processed (there
is an extra sysctl to disable it) and can be filled from user-
land by writing to the KERN_ARND sysctl; init(8) is permitted
to add to arandom and restir.
Securelevel provides convenient means of "locking down" a system to a de-
gree suited to its environment. It is normally set at boot via the
rc.securelevel(8) script, or the superuser may raise securelevel at any
time by modifying the kern.securelevel sysctl(8) variable. However, only
init(8) may lower it once the system has entered secure mode. A kernel
built with option INSECURE in the config file will default to permanently
insecure mode. (Setting the securelevel to -1 in /etc/rc.securelevel has
the same effect.)
Highly secure mode may seem Draconian, but is intended as a last line of
defence should the superuser account be compromised. Its effects preclude
circumvention of file flags by direct modification of a raw disk device,
or erasure of a filesystem by means of newfs(8). Further, it can limit
the potential damage of a compromised "firewall" by prohibiting the
modification of packet filter rules. Preventing the system clock from be-
ing set backwards aids in post-mortem analysis and helps ensure the in-
tegrity of logs. Precision timekeeping is not affected because the clock
may still be slowed.
Because securelevel can be modified with the in-kernel debugger ddb(4), a
convenient means of locking it off (if present) is provided on highly
secure systems. This is accomplished by setting ddb.console and ddb.panic
to 0 with the sysctl(8) utility.
/etc/rc.securelevel commands that run before the security level changes
chflags(2), settimeofday(2), mem(4), options(4), init(8), rc(8),
sysctl(8)
The securelevel manual page first appeared in OpenBSD 2.6.
Mounting was disallowed in highly secure mode in MirBSD #9.
Securelevels defend against a compromisal of the root account. The 4.4BSD
kernel however is not designed for such thing, thus, securelevels should
only be used as a tool for convenience, not be seen as an actual security
measure.
The list of securelevel's effects may not be comprehensive.
MirBSD #10-current August 25, 2019 1