MirOS Manual: Xsecurity(7)


XSECURITY(7)	    UNIX Programmer's Manual	     XSECURITY(7)

NAME

     Xsecurity - X display access control

SYNOPSIS

     X provides mechanism for implementing many access control
     systems. The sample implementation includes five mechanisms:
	 Host Access		       Simple host-based access control.
	 MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1	       Shared plain-text "cookies".
	 XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1	       Secure DES based private-keys.
	 SUN-DES-1		       Based on Sun's secure rpc system.
	 MIT-KERBEROS-5		       Kerberos Version 5 user-to-user.

ACCESS SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS

     Host Access
	  Any client on a host in the host access control list is
	  allowed access to the X server.  This system can work
	  reasonably well in an environment where everyone trusts
	  everyone, or when only a single person can log in to a
	  given machine, and is easy to use when the list of
	  hosts used is small. This system does not work well
	  when multiple people can log in to a single machine and
	  mutual trust does not exist. The list of allowed hosts
	  is stored in the X server and can be changed with the
	  xhost command. When using the more secure mechanisms
	  listed below, the host list is normally configured to
	  be the empty list, so that only authorized programs can
	  connect to the display.

     MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1
	  When using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1, the client sends a 128
	  bit "cookie" along with the connection setup informa-
	  tion. If the cookie presented by the client matches one
	  that the X server has, the connection is allowed
	  access. The cookie is chosen so that it is hard to
	  guess; xdm generates such cookies automatically when
	  this form of access control is used. The user's copy of
	  the cookie is usually stored in the .Xauthority file in
	  the home directory, although the environment variable
	  XAUTHORITY can be used to specify an alternate loca-
	  tion. Xdm automatically passes a cookie to the server
	  for each new login session, and stores the cookie in
	  the user file at login.

	  The cookie is transmitted on the network without
	  encryption, so there is nothing to prevent a network
	  snooper from obtaining the data and using it to gain
	  access to the X server.  This system is useful in an
	  environment where many users are running applications
	  on the same machine and want to avoid interference from
	  each other, with the caveat that this control is only
	  as good as the access control to the physical network.
	  In environments where network-level snooping is

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	  difficult, this system can work reasonably well.

     XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1
	  Sites who compile with DES support can use a DES-based
	  access control mechanism called XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1. It
	  is similar in usage to MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 in that a key
	  is stored in the .Xauthority file and is shared with
	  the X server. However, this key consists of two parts -
	  a 56 bit DES encryption key and 64 bits of random data
	  used as the authenticator.

	  When connecting to the X server, the application gen-
	  erates 192 bits of data by combining the current time
	  in seconds (since 00:00 1/1/1970 GMT) along with 48
	  bits of "identifier".	 For TCP/IPv4 connections, the
	  identifier is the address plus port number; for local
	  connections it is the process ID and 32 bits to form a
	  unique id (in case multiple connections to the same
	  server are made from a single process).  This 192 bit
	  packet is then encrypted using the DES key and sent to
	  the X server, which is able to verify if the requestor
	  is authorized to connect by decrypting with the same
	  DES key and validating the authenticator and additional
	  data. This system is useful in many environments where
	  host-based access control is inappropriate and where
	  network security cannot be ensured.

     SUN-DES-1
	  Recent versions of SunOS (and some other systems) have
	  included a secure public key remote procedure call sys-
	  tem.	This system is based on the notion of a network
	  principal; a user name and NIS domain pair. Using this
	  system, the X server can securely discover the actual
	  user name of the requesting process.	It involves
	  encrypting data with the X server's public key, and so
	  the identity of the user who started the X server is
	  needed for this; this identity is stored in the .Xau-
	  thority file.	 By extending the semantics of "host
	  address" to include this notion of network principal,
	  this form of access control is very easy to use.

	  To allow access by a new user, use xhost.  For example,
	      xhost keith@ ruth@mit.edu
	  adds "keith" from the NIS domain of the local machine,
	  and "ruth" in the "mit.edu" NIS domain.  For keith or
	  ruth to successfully connect to the display, they must
	  add the principal who started the server to their .Xau-
	  thority file.	 For example:
	      xauth add expo.lcs.mit.edu:0 SUN-DES-1 unix.expo.lcs.mit.edu@our.domain.edu
	  This system only works on machines which support Secure
	  RPC, and only for users which have set up the appropri-
	  ate public/private key pairs on their system.	 See the

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	  Secure RPC documentation for details. To access the
	  display from a remote host, you may have to do a keylo-
	  gin on the remote host first.

     MIT-KERBEROS-5
	  Kerberos is a network-based authentication scheme
	  developed by MIT for Project Athena.	It allows mutu-
	  ally suspicious principals to authenticate each other
	  as long as each trusts a third party, Kerberos.  Each
	  principal has a secret key known only to it and Ker-
	  beros.  Principals includes servers, such as an FTP
	  server or X server, and human users, whose key is their
	  password.  Users gain access to services by getting
	  Kerberos tickets for those services from a Kerberos
	  server.  Since the X server has no place to store a
	  secret key, it shares keys with the user who logs in.
	  X authentication thus uses the user-to-user scheme of
	  Kerberos version 5.

	  When you log in via xdm, xdm will use your password to
	  obtain the initial Kerberos tickets.	xdm stores the
	  tickets in a credentials cache file and sets the
	  environment variable KRB5CCNAME to point to the file.
	  The credentials cache is destroyed when the session
	  ends to reduce the chance of the tickets being stolen
	  before they expire.

	  Since Kerberos is a user-based authorization protocol,
	  like the SUN-DES-1 protocol, the owner of a display can
	  enable and disable specific users, or Kerberos princi-
	  pals. The xhost client is used to enable or disable
	  authorization. For example,
	      xhost krb5:judy krb5:gildea@x.org
	  adds "judy" from the Kerberos realm of the local
	  machine, and "gildea" from the "x.org" realm.

THE AUTHORIZATION FILE

     Except for Host Access control, each of these systems uses
     data stored in the .Xauthority file to generate the correct
     authorization information to pass along to the X server at
     connection setup.	MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and XDM-
     AUTHORIZATION-1 store secret data in the file; so anyone who
     can read the file can gain access to the X server.	 SUN-
     DES-1 stores only the identity of the principal who started
     the server (unix.hostname@domain when the server is started
     by xdm), and so it is not useful to anyone not authorized to
     connect to the server.

     Each entry in the .Xauthority file matches a certain connec-
     tion family (TCP/IP, DECnet or local connections) and X
     display name (hostname plus display number).  This allows
     multiple authorization entries for different displays to

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     share the same data file.	A special connection family (Fam-
     ilyWild, value 65535) causes an entry to match every
     display, allowing the entry to be used for all connections.
     Each entry additionally contains the authorization name and
     whatever private authorization data is needed by that
     authorization type to generate the correct information at
     connection setup time.

     The xauth program manipulates the .Xauthority file format.
     It understands the semantics of the connection families and
     address formats, displaying them in an easy to understand
     format.  It also understands that SUN-DES-1 and MIT-
     KERBEROS-5 use string values for the authorization data, and
     displays them appropriately.

     The X server (when running on a workstation) reads authori-
     zation information from a file name passed on the command
     line with the -auth option (see the Xserver manual page).
     The authorization entries in the file are used to control
     access to the server.  In each of the authorization schemes
     listed above, the data needed by the server to initialize an
     authorization scheme is identical to the data needed by the
     client to generate the appropriate authorization informa-
     tion, so the same file can be used by both processes.  This
     is especially useful when xinit is used.

     MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1
	  This system uses 128 bits of data shared between the
	  user and the X server. Any collection of bits can be
	  used.	 Xdm generates these keys using a cryptographi-
	  cally secure pseudo random number generator, and so the
	  key to the next session cannot be computed from the
	  current session key.

     XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1
	  This system uses two pieces of information.  First, 64
	  bits of random data, second a 56 bit DES encryption key
	  (again, random data) stored in 8 bytes, the last byte
	  of which is ignored.	Xdm generates these keys using
	  the same random number generator as is used for MIT-
	  MAGIC-COOKIE-1.

     SUN-DES-1
	  This system needs a string representation of the prin-
	  cipal which identifies the associated X server. This
	  information is used to encrypt the client's authority
	  information when it is sent to the X server. When xdm
	  starts the X server, it uses the root principal for the
	  machine on which it is running (unix.hostname@domain,
	  e.g., "unix.expire.lcs.mit.edu@our.domain.edu").  Put-
	  ting the correct principal name in the .Xauthority file
	  causes Xlib to generate the appropriate authorization

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	  information using the secure RPC library.

     MIT-KERBEROS-5
	  Kerberos reads tickets from the cache pointed to by the
	  KRB5CCNAME environment variable, so does not use any
	  data from the .Xauthority file.  An entry with no data
	  must still exist to tell clients that MIT-KERBEROS-5 is
	  available.

	  Unlike the .Xauthority file for clients, the authority
	  file passed by xdm to a local X server (with ``-auth
	  filename'', see xdm(1)) does contain the name of the
	  credentials cache, since the X server will not have the
	  KRB5CCNAME environment variable set. The data of the
	  MIT-KERBEROS-5 entry is the credentials cache name and
	  has the form ``UU:FILE:filename'', where filename is
	  the name of the credentials cache file created by xdm.
	  Note again that this form is not used by clients.

FILES

     .Xauthority

SEE ALSO

     X(7), xdm(1), xauth(1), xhost(1), xinit(1), Xserver(1)

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